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Use of the Market Wage Rate in Employment

Discrimination Suits: Equal Work as
the Key to Application
Since 1963, Congress has prohibited employers from paying
women less than men due to their gender.' Employers, however,
have proffered several justifications for a wage disparity between
men and women, including the lower market wage rate for women. 2
Courts have treated this "market defense" differently depending
mostly upon whether the plaintiff brings her claim under the Equal
Pay Act 3 or under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 4 By
relying only on the statute used by the plaintiff to bring suit while
ignoring the policy considerations behind each theory of recovery,
courts sometimes allow the use of the market defense beyond its
intended scope.
This note analyzes the treatment of the market defense in employment discrimination suits. Part I reviews the market defense
theory in cases brought under the Equal Pay Act, while Part II studies the use of market wages under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Part III suggests that courts should carefully examine the
equality of work in cases brought under the alternative acts, to insure that the policy justifications under each theory of recovery are
properly served.
I.

The Equal Pay Act

Passed in 1963, the Equal Pay Act forbids an employer from
paying a woman less than a man for performing an equal or subI See notes 3-4 infra and accompanying text.
2 The market wage rate, in this context, represents the wage or salary that a person
can command in the labor market for performing a given task. Employers have advanced
the market rate theory as a defense in employment discrimination suits by arguing that the
market wage rate for women was lower than for men either when performing equal work,
see notes 5-14 infra and accompanying text, or different tasks, see notes 20-35 infra and accompanying text. On the other hand, plaintiffs in some wage discrimination cases have
advanced the market rate theory in their complaints, pleading that an employer has wrongfully relied upon the market wage rate to set a woman's wage. See notes 36-46 infra and
accompanying text.
Employers have proffered several other justifications for a wage disparity. See, e.g.,
Hamm v. Board of Regents, 708 F.2d 647 (11 th Cir. 1983) (educational achievement/extra
duties); Homer v. Mary Inst., 613 F.2d 706 (8th Cir. 1980) (superior qualifications); Usery
v. Johnson, 436 F. Supp. 35 (D.N.D. 1977) (participation in a management training
program).
3 Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982)).
4 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982)).
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stantially equal task. 5 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving
equal work. 6 The Act also provides employers with four affirmative
defenses. Upon proof that an employer pays a woman less than a
man in a substantially equal job, the employer must show that the
disparity is due to: (1) seniority, (2) merit, (3) quality or quantity of
production, or (4) any factor other than sex. 7 Employers who have
paid women less than men for performing the same task have
claimed that they did not violate the Act because they relied on the
fact that men commanded a higher wage than women in the market.
Thus, their reliance on the market wage rate fell under the fourth
defense-a factor other than sex.8 Although courts have allowed
use of verifiable economic factors unrelated to the labor market in
calculating a different wage for men and women, employers cannot
use the market wage rate alone as a defense.
Early treatment of the market defense to the Equal Pay Act
cases varied. Hodgson v. Brookhaven General Hospital9 represented
one line of cases, comprised mostly of decisions from the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which found that an employer's
greater bargaining power with respect to women did not fulfill the
5

The Equal Pay Act, in pertinent part, provides that:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate.... between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees ... at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the
opposite sex ... for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal
skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working
conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system;
(ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of
production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex: Provided,
That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce the
wage rate of any employee.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982) (emphasis in original).
6 Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974). Substantially equal
work fulfills this requirement for the plaintiff. See, e.g., Usery v. Columbia Univ., 568 F.2d
953, 958-59 (2d Cir. 1977); Brennan v. Prince William Hosp. Corp., 503 F.2d 282, 285-86
(4th Cir. 1974). In comparing two jobs to determine equality of work, job titles are not
determinitive. See Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 697 (9th Cir. 1984);
EEOC v. Mercy Hosp. & Medical Center, 709 F.2d 1195, 1197 (7th Cir. 1983); 29 C.F.R.
§ 800.121 (1985).
7 See note 5 supra.
8 See generally Note, Not Just Any "Factor Other Than Sex ": An Analysis of the FourthAffirmative Defense to the EqualPay Act, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 318 (1984) (explores the scope of the
"factor other than sex" defense to the Equal Pay Act as defined judicially).
9 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970). In Brookhaven, female nurses' aides sued defendant
hospital contending that they were paid less than male orderlies for substantially equal
work. The hospital asserted that the additional duties sometimes performed by orderlies,
including lifting heavy patients and catheterizing patients, distinguished the case from application of an equal work standard. The court found that the relevant inquiry when determining the equality of two jobs was whether the jobs required equal effort, and remanded
the case for findings of fact. Id. at 725.
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"factor other than sex" defense. 10 The Brookhaven court found that
this greater bargaining power was "not the kind of factor Congress
had in mind" when creating the fourth affirmative defense, and thus
would not allow a market rate defense by the hospital.1 1
This line of cases contrasted with Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes,
Inc. ,'12 where the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that the disparity in wages between men and women
salespersons performing equal work was justified by the greater
economic value of the male salespersons to the employer. Robert
Hall showed that the men's department of the store earned substantially greater profits than the women's, and that only men sold
men's clothing and vice versa. 13 The court held that the increased
economic benefit to the employer was a factor other than sex which
Robert Hall could use as an affirmative defense against the Equal
4
Pay Act discrimination claim.'
The United States Supreme Court considered the issue of the
market as a factor other than sex under the Equal Pay Act in 1974.
In Corning Glass Works v. Brennan,' 5 the Court held that Corning violated the Equal Pay Act by paying male inspectors more than female
inspectors performing substantially equal work.' 6 This decision,
10 Id. at 726. See also Brennan v. Prince William Hosp. Corp., 503 F.2d 282, 286 (4th
Cir. 1974); Brennan v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896, 902 (5th Cir. 1974); Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 241 n.12 (5th Cir. 1973); Hodgson v. Maison
Miramon, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 843, 850 (E.D. La. 1972).
I1 436 F.2d at 726.
12 473 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1973). In Robert Hall, female salespersons selling women's
clothing brought suit under the Equal Pay Act alleging unequal pay for work equal to male
salespersons selling men's clothing. The differential resulted from the commission sales
schedule. Because men's clothing sold at a higher profit margin for the company, male
salespersons received higher salaries than female salespersons. Id. at 591-92.
13 Id. at 591,596.
14 Id. at 597. Robert Hall represents the farthest any court has gone to allow an economic justification as a factor other than sex, and commentators criticized the decision
when it was handed down. See, e.g., Note, EqualPay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964-GreaterProfitability of Male Salesclerks Permits Unequal Payfor Female Salesclerks in Clothing
Sales, 20 WAYNE L. REV. 1155 (1974); Case Comment, Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes,
Inc.: Concealed Sex Discriminationand the Equal Pay Act, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1974).
15 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
16 Id. at 209-10. In Corning, because a state law had previously precluded women from
working at night, most female inspectors worked during the day while most male inspectors
worked at night. The Court had to decide whether the difference between day shifts and
night shifts constituted different working conditions so that the Equal Pay Act would not
apply to the wage differential. See note 5 supra ("and which are performed under similar
working conditions.. ."). The Court stated that recognizing the difference in the time of
the shifts as constituting different working conditions would frustrate the remedial purposes of the Act. 417 U.S. at 208. Accordingly, the Court held that the day and night shifts
were not different working conditions. Id. At least one commentator has suggested that
this holding was due in part to testimony given by Corning's former Director of Industrial
Relations to House and Senate subcommittees considering the Equal Pay Act. See W.
FOGEL, THE EQUAL PAY ACT: IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPARABLE WORTH 51-53 (1984). The
testimony revealed that Corning's own job evaluation plans included two categories under

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:513

which marks the only treatment by the Court of the market defense
to the Equal Pay Act, rejected the market defense uneqivocally.
The differential arose simply because men would not work at
the low rates paid women inspectors, and it reflected ajob market in which Coming could pay women less than men for the
same work. That the company took advantage of such a situation may be understandable as a matter of economics, but its
differential nevertheless became illegal once Congress
enacted
17
into law the principle of equal pay for equal work.
In effect, the Supreme Court affirmed the Brookhaven line of
cases, since the job market alone could not be used as a factor other
than sex defense,' 8 but did not overrule the Robert Hall formulation.
Because the employer in Robert Hall could point to a verifiable factor other than sex, namely the higher profitability of the work performed by male salespersons as compared to the substantially equal
work performed by the female salespersons, the market wage alone
was not the basis of the affirmative defense.' 9 Therefore, Coming
did not undermine the Robert Hall rationale. Rather, Corning held
that the labor market alone was not a factor other than sex, and did
not evaluate a verifiable economic factor as found in Robert Hall.
II.

Title VII

The Equal Pay Act represents only one theory under which a
plaintiff can allege sex-based wage discrimination, a theory based
on equal work. 20 When Congress passed Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,21 federal proscription of employment discrimination expanded to reach non-equal work situations.22 Courts have
"working conditions": surroundings and hazards. Time of day never entered the discussion, either internally at Corning or in the testimony before the subcommittees. Id.

17
18
19
20

417 U.S.
See notes
See notes
See notes

at 205.
9-11 supra and accompanying text.
12-14 supra and accompanying text.
5-6 supra.

21

Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(A)(1), 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982)).
22 Id. ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation ...because of such individual's...
sex ....").See also County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981). In Gunther,
female guards in the female section of the county jail sued the county under Title VII. The
guards claimed that they were paid less than male guards in the male section of the jail for
substantially equal work. The employer claimed that the Bennett Amendment to Title VII
(Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(h), 78 Stat. 241, 257 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)
(1982)), which allowed any differentiation in wages "authorized" by the Equal Pay Act,
precluded any Title VII wage discrimination case which could not fulfill the equal work
requirement of the Equal Pay Act. See note 5 supra. The female guards contended that the
Bennett Amendment only incorporated the affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act into
Title VII, and not the equal work requirement. The Supreme Court opted for the latter
interpretation, holding that the affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act were incorporated

NOTES
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developed two theories of recovery under Title VII, and each theory treats the market wage rate differently.
A.

Disparate Treatment

Under a disparate treatment theory of recovery, the plaintiff
must show a disfavorable treatment of employees based on impermissible criteria, such as gender, race, or religion. 23 This showing
creates a prima facie presumption of discriminatory intent.2 4 The
defendant then bears the burden of producing some "legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason" for the disfavorable treatment. 25 If the
defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must then prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the reasons advanced by the
26
employer are in fact only a pretext for discrimination.
In a disparate treatment wage discrimination case, the plaintiff
can meet her prima facie burden by showing four elements: (1) she
is a woman; (2) she occupies a sex-segregated job classification; (3)
the classification is paid less than a sex-segregated job classification
occupied by men; and (4) that the two job classifications are so similar that a court can infer that they are of comparable value to the
employer. 27 The employer can then produce evidence that the
market wage rate constituted a legitimate, non-discriminatory rea28
son for the differential.
Courts have favorably responded to the use of a market rate by
employers as a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to defend a
wage differential. For example, in Briggs v. City of Madison,29 public
health nurses, most of whom were female, brought a claim under
into Title VII by the Bennett Amendment, but the equal work requirement was not. 452
U.S. at 168.
23 See generally United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711
(1983) (discrimination based on race); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248 (1981) (discrimination based on sex); Board of Trustees of Keene State College v.
Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978) (sex); Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978)
(race); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (race).
24 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Some cases have set forth specific tests to meet
this burden. McDonnell Douglas, for example, held that:
This [burden may be met] by showing (i) that [the plaintiff] belongs to a racial
minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer
was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv)
that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued
to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id. (footnote omitted). All cases are clear, however, that these tests must be flexible to fit
the facts of each particular case. See, e.g., id. at 802 n.13.
25 Id. at 802.
26 Id. at 804. See generally Chamallas, Exploringthe "Entire Spectrum" of DisparateTreatment
Under Title VII: Rules GoverningPredominatelyFemaleJobs, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 5-22 (reviewing judicial development of the disparate treatment model).
27 Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435, 445 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
28 See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
29 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
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the disparate treatment theory of Title VII against the city. The
nurses alleged that they were paid less due to their sex even though
they performed work equal or greater in skill, effort, and responsibility than public health sanitarians, most of whom were male. 30 After the court found that the nurses had met their prima facie
burden to establish a discriminatory presumption,3 ' the defendant
pointed to the higher market wage for male sanitarians as a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the wage disparity.3 2 The
court accepted this justification, holding that an employer's liability
under Title VII extends only to his own actions, 3 3 and not "to conditions of the marketplace which he did not create." 34 Because the
plaintiff could not subsequently show that the city's reliance on the
market was only a pretext, the court found no violation of Title
VII.35
B.

Disparate Impact

Courts are more amenable to market-based justifications of
wage disparities under the disparate impact model than under the
disparate treatment model. Under the disparate impact model, the
plaintiff need not show or imply the defendant's discriminatory intent. Instead, the plaintiff need only show a disproportionate impact on a group protected by Title VII due to a "facially neutral
policy" of the employer. 36 Once the plaintiff makes this showing,
the burden switches to the defendant. If the defendant can prove
that the policy is required by a business necessity, the policy will not
violate Title VII.3 7 Contrast this model with the disparate treat30

Id. at 437.

31 See text accompanying note 27 supra (test employed by the Briggs court to find that
plaintiffs met their prima facie burden).
32 536 F. Supp. at 446.
33 Id. at 447. See also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
335 n.15 (1977) (proof of discriminatory motive is critical to a disparate treatment claim).
34 536 F. Supp. at 447.
35 Id. at 449-50.
36 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs, an employee brought a
Title VII action against the employer power company, alleging that requiring a high school
diploma and satisfactory scores on two aptitude tests would disproportionately impact
upon blacks. The Court noted that Congress intended Title VII to remove barriers that
had acted to favor white employees over others in the past. This purpose mandated that
"practices, procedures, or tests, neutral on theirface, and even neutral in terms of intent" be
eliminated. Id. at 430 (emphasis added). The Court then stated the test for disparate impact cases. "The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude [a protected class] cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the
practice is prohibited." Id. at 431.
37

Id. See generally Note, Business Necessity: JudicialDualism and the Searchfor Adequate Stan-

dards, 15 GA. L. REV. 376 (1981) (traces judicial evolution of the business necessity defense
to disparate impact claims, comparing the Supreme Court with lower federal court
developments).
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ment model, where the plaintiff always has the burden of proof.38
In the disparate impact model, the plaintiff advances the market rate argument by claiming that reliance on the market wage
demonstrates a facially neutral policy of the employer which disproportionately impacts upon women.3 9 Courts have not accepted this
argument, holding that the labor market does not constitute an internal policy for purposes of Title VII disparate impact analysis. 40
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dealt spe4
cifically with this issue in Spaulding v. University of Washington. '
In Spaulding, the nursing faculty of the University of Washington alleged sex-based wage discrimination under the disparate impact model because they were paid less, on average, than the
42
average faculty member of less female-dominated departments.
The court rejected the faculty's claim. The court held that a wage
differential between jobs requiring different skills did not violate
Title VII when the jobs commanded different prices in the labor
market, even if the jobs were of equal worth to the employer. 43
Specifically, the court found that "[rielying on competitive market
prices does not qualify as a facially neutral policy for purposes of
the disparate impact analysis . . . . ,44 Because the University relied as "price-takers" on the price of labor, the market wage rate,
the court reasoned that the University did not have a disparate impact "policy" concerning the market.45 Therefore, the University
did not violate Title VII by relying on the market to set faculty
wages .46

III.

The Importance of Equal Work

Courts treat the market rate theory differently depending on
38 See notes 23-26 supra and accompanying text.
39 See AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985); Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 705 (9th Cir. 1984); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356
(8th Cir. 1977).
40 See, e.g., AFSCME, 770 F.2d at 1405-06; Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 707; Christensen, 563
F.2d at 356.
41 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984).
42 Id. at 705-08. The faculty also charged violation of the Equal Pay Act and disparate
treatment under Title VII; these claims failed. Id. at 696-98, 699-704.
43 Id. at 707 (citing Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 1977)).
44 740 F.2d at 708.
45 Id. The Spaulding court draws an artificial distinction here. Courts have prohibited
employers from instituting policies based on other factors beyond the control of the employer in disparate impact cases. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)
(possession of a high school diploma); Gregory v. Litton Sys., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal.
1970) (prior arrest record), modified on other grounds, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972). But cf
AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1405-06 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that relying on
market rates when setting wages was not a "specific, clearly deliniated employment practice
...that yields to disparate impact analysis").
46 740 F.2d at 708.
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whether the plaintiff brings her claim under the Equal Pay Act or
Title VII, and the theory of recovery used under Title VII. Courts
deciding cases under the Equal Pay Act give less deference to an
employer's reliance on the market than in Title VII cases. The
equal work requirement of the Equal Pay Act explains the different
treatment. 4 7 In Briggs v. City of Madison,4 8 the court identified the
significance of the equal work requirement:
In the cited Equal Pay Act cases, thejobs were so similar as to be
interchangeable; that is, a female worker could perform the job
held by male workers, if given the opportunity, and vice versa.
Where, however, different skills are required for the performance of the jobs, the employer may explain and justify an apparent illegal wage disparity by showing that persons possessing
the requisite
skills are commanding higher wage rates in the lo49
cal market.
An employer paying different wages to a man and woman
whose jobs involve equal work cannot argue that the market wage
rate justified the discrepancy.5 0 Because the employer is receiving
the same effort from these two individuals, reliance on an external
factor like the market wage rate implies that the factor is actually a
pretext for sex-based wage discrimination. 5 1 The equality of the
work performed by the man and woman precludes the employer
from relying on the bifurcated market wage to determine
52
compensation.
On the other hand, a non-equal work scenario makes an implication of sex discrimination more difficult. The employer no
longer receives an equal effort from the man and woman, so the
benefit derived from their efforts may differ as well. Many factors
enter the employer's wage setting analysis, such as the number of
available individuals qualified to fill the position, the ability of workers to bargain collectively, and the intrinsic value of the work to the
employer. 53 Without a job entailing equal work for comparison,
the best barometer available to the employer in setting wages for a
job is the market wage rate for thatjob. 54 In this situation, the mar47 See notes 5-6 supra and accompanying text.
48 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis. 1982). See notes 29-35 supra and accompanying text.
49

Id. at 447.

50

See notes 9-11, 15-19 supra and accompanying text.

51 See generally Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 148, 160-62 (E.D. Cal. 1981),
rev'd, 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982).
52 See Note, The Exception Swallows the Rule: Market Conditions as a "Factor Other Than Sex'"
in Title VII Disparate Impact Litigation, 86 W. VA. L. REV. 165, 172 (1984) (noting that Equal
Pay Act treatment of the market defense only applies to equal work situations).
53 See AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1407 (9th Cir. 1985); Christensen v.
Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 1977).
54 See Shattuck, Sex-Based Wage Discrimination: A Management View, 62 DEN. L. REV. 393,
400-02 (1985) (arguing that the market takes into account basic values of the job, such as
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ket wage rate reflects not a discriminatory pretext but a valid indica55
tor used by the employer to set wages.
Therefore, the equality of the work should determine the availability of the market wage rate as a defense to employment discrimination suits, rather than the statute under which the plaintiff brings
suit. To retain this crucial distinction, courts should categorize
cases according to the equality of the work involved, and use this
categorization to determine the availability of a market wage rate
defense to the employer.
A. A Casefor Examination: Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co.
Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co. 56 demonstrates how a court can
confuse the issues by ignoring the equality of the work and focusing
instead on the statute used by the plaintiff to bring suit. In Kouba, a
female sales agent brought suit under Title VII representing a class
of all female sales agents, and claimed that Allstate discriminated in
setting wages by relying in part on the individual's prior salary to
set his or her minimum salary. 57 Female agents averaged a lower
minimum salary then male agents performing the same task. 58 The
plaintiff argued that the use of prior salary caused this disparity
skills, education, experience, and working conditions). But see Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination,Job Segregation and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MIcH.J.L. REF. 397, 44143 (1979) (arguing that dependence on the market wage rate in setting wages perpetuates
historical wage discrimination in predominately female jobs).
55 See American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986). In American
Nurses', Judge Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit discussed in detail the use of the market wage rate defense by employers to set wages. The
American Nurses' Association and others brought suit against the State of Illinois, charging
sex discrimination under Title VII. The plaintiffs claimed that the State discriminated
against traditionally female-dominated jobs when setting wages. In general terms, Judge
Posner stated that "economists point out that the ratio of wages in different jobs is determined by the market rather than by any a priori conception of relative merit .... " Id. at
719. Judge Posner then recognized that "mere failure to rectify traditional wage disparaties
between predominately male and predominately female jobs [does not violate] federal
law." Id. at 720 (citing Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 706-07 (9th Cir.
1984)); see notes 41-46 supra and accompanying text. He then approached the question of
whether reliance on the market wage rate could permit an inference of intentional discrimination. This question was crucial to the case, since the plaintiffs sued under a disparate
treatment model. 783 F.2d at 722; see notes 23-26 supra and accompanying text.
Judge Posner relied on the dissent in County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 181
(1981) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) (note 22 supra), and on AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d
1401 (9th Cir. 1985) (note 39 supra), to find that Title VII does not permit an inference of
discrimination based on an employer paying market wages. 783 F.2d at 720-22. Because
American Nurses' and the two cases cited therein do not involve ecual work, this note agrees
with the courts' conclusion to the extent that the market wage rate can be used by employers to set wages in non-equalwork situations. If an equal work suit were brought under Title
VII, however, this note would contend that the equality of the work should preclude the
employer from relying on the market wage rate.
56 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982).
57 Id. at 875.
58 Id.
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which, in turn, violated Title VII. 5 9 The defendant asserted that
prior salary constituted a valid factor other than sex,6 0 an affirmative defense under the Equal Pay Act.6 1
Allstate contended that, because Kouba brought suit under Ti62
tle VII, the standard Title VII evidentiary burdens should apply.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding that
an employer bears the burden of proving that a wage differential
results from a factor other than sex, even when the plaintiff brings
suit under Title VII.63 The court then proceeded to determine how

the employer could carry this burden.
At this point, the court's blindness to the equal work performed by the male and female agents surfaced. 64 The court never
alluded to the equal work of the agents, and did not apply the anal-

yses from cases involving prior salary as a wage setting factor in
equal work suits 65 or other economic justifications used by employers in equal work situations.6 6 The absence of equal work analysis
is particularly interesting since the court relied on Coming Glass

Works v. Brennan,6 7 an equal work case decided under the Equal Pay
Act, to find the burden on the employer to prove prior salary as a

68
factor other than sex.
Rather than follow a traditional Equal Pay Act approach, the

court created a new line of analysis: a factor other than sex, when
pleaded in a Title VII wage discrimination suit, must have an ac59 Id.
60 A helpful discussion of prior salary as a factor other than sex can be found in Futran
v. RING Radio Co., 501 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. Ga. 1980). In Futran,a female radio personality
sued the defendant radio station, claiming sex-based wage discrimination because a male
radio personality was paid considerably more for substantially equal work. The employer
advanced prior salary as one factor other than sex to justify the differential. The court
discounted this defense, stating that "to give more than nominal consideration to such a
factor would serve to perpetuate the historic employment discrimination in wages suffered
by females in the workforce." Id. at 739 n.2. Given the close connection between plaintiff's
prior salary and her market wage rate, the same analysis should apply to each factor when
asserted as a defense.
61 691 F.2d at 875. See notes 5-8 supra and accompanying text.
62 Id. Neither Kouba nor the court specified whether the case was pleaded under a
disparate impact or disparate treatment theory. See id. at 875 n.4.
63 Id. at 875. The court came to this conclusion based on the fact that the Supreme
Court, in Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974), had interpreted the
factor other than sex language from the Equal Pay Act as an affirmative defense for the
employer. See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text.
64 See text accompanying note 58 supra.
65 See, e.g., Futran v. RING Radio Co., 501 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. Ga. 1980); note 60 supra.
While the Kouba court did cite generally to the mention of prior salary in Futran (691 F.2d at
876, 877 n.7), it did not apply the analysis given by the Futran court concerning prior salary
as a factor other than sex.
66 See, e.g., Coming Glass, 417 U.S. 188; Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 473 F.2d
589 (3rd Cir. 1973); notes 12-17 supra and accompanying text.
67 417 U.S. 188 (1974). See notes 15-17 supra.
68 See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
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ceptable business reason. 69 In a footnote to this new approach, the
court cited to CorningGlass for the proposition that "[n]ot every reason making economic sense is acceptable." 70 Given this mention of
Corning Glass by the court, and given the similarity in language to
the business necessity defense under the disparate impact model of
Title VII, 7 1 the Kouba court apparently intended to set a new line of
analysis to be used when a defendant to a Title VII wage suit pleads
a factor other than sex to defend the suit. This "split-the-difference" approach, however, confuses the issue unnecessarily, and
courts should not use it to judge economic justifications to wage
72
discrimination suits.
1. Kouba under the Equal Pay Act
If Kouba were treated as an Equal Pay Act claim, the cases
clearly indicate that some factor asidefrom the market would have to
justify the wage differential. 73 Kouba could meet her prima facie
burden under the Act by showing that she and other female agents
were paid less for work equal to male agents. 74 Allstate would then
plead prior salary as an affirmative defense, just as they actually did
plead. 75
The farthest any court has gone in allowing an economic consideration to fulfill this requirement was Hodgson v. Robert Hall
Clothes, InC.76 In Robert Hall, the court held that the increased profitability of male salespersons justified their higher wage over female
salespersons. 77 In Kouba, however, Allstate proffered no such factor; the prior salary of the employee does not affect the profitability
of his or her performance. 7 8 In fact, Kouba recognized the possibility of an employer using prior salary as a pretext to discrimina69 691 F.2d at 876. But cf.Bence v. Detroit Health Corp., 712 F.2d 1024, 1030 (6th Cir.
1983) (reading Kouba as employing the Robert Hall rationale).
70 Id. at 876 n.6. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
71 See notes 36-38 supra and accompanying text.
72 At least one court has followed Kouba's "acceptable business reason" approach. See
EEOC v. Fremont Christian School, 609 F. Supp. 344, 351 (N.D. Cal. 1984), af'd on other
grounds, 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986).
73 See notes 9-19 supra and accompanying text.
74 See Coming Glass, 417 U.S. at 195; notes 5-6 supra. Some courts have found that Equal
Pay Act burdens apply where, as in Kouba, the plaintiff brings an equal work claim under
Title VII. See Orahood v. Board of Trustees, 645 F.2d 651, 654 & n.3 (8th Cir. 1981);
Chang v. University of Rhode Island, 606 F. Supp. 1161, 1188 (D.R.I. 1985); Schulte v.
Wilson Indus., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 324, 337 (S.D. Tex. 1982). These cases have not used the
analysis of this note to justify the rulings, but rather have based the rulings on a desire to
construe the two statutes in harmony. See, e.g., 645 F.2d at 654.
75 See notes 60-61 supra and accompanying text.
76 473 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1973). See notes 12-14 supra and accompanying text.
77 See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
78 See Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876-78.
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tion. 79 This possibility seems analogous to the market rate
concerns expressed in Briggs v. City of Madison80 in that two employees being paid differently for substantially equal work strengthens
the inference of sex discrimination. 8 1 Therefore, reliance on prior
salary would not likely survive as an Equal Pay Act factor other than
sex.
2.

Kouba as a Non-Equal Work Case Under Title VII

Assuming arguendo that the jobs compared in Kouba did not entail equal work, courts would likely allow Allstate to use prior salary
82
as a wage setting factor. Under the disparate treatment model,
the employer could advance prior salary as a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the wage disparity.8 3 Analogizing to treatment of the market wage rate under this scenario,8 4 courts would
likely hold that Allstate could not be held responsible for market
conditions that they did not create.8 5
If the plaintiff chose a disparate impact model to frame the
case,8 6 Allstate's use of the factor seems even more certain. The
reliance on prior salary would not be an internal policy for purposes of Title VII, analogizing again to market wage rate decisions.8 7 Therefore, the plaintiff's prima facie case would not be
carried under the disparate impact model of Title VII.88
IV.

Conclusion

The equal work requirement of the Equal Pay Act explains the
denial of a market wage rate defense to employers in wage discrimination suits brought under the Act. Equal work suits, however, can
be brought under Title VII as well.8 9 Courts have been more amenable to the market wage rate and other economic justifications for
unequal wages in Title VII cases than under the Equal Pay Act. To
ensure that the policy concerns behind the denial of the market de79 Id. at 876. See also EEOC v. Hay Assoc., 545 F. Supp. 1064, 1084 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(finding that economic benefit could only justify unequal salaries if it could prove the man's
work more profitable).
80 536 F. Supp. 435, 445 (W.D. Wis. 1982); see text accompanying notes 48-49 supra.
81 See notes 47-52 supra and accompanying text.
82 See notes 23-28 supra and accompanying text.
83 See text accompanying note 25 supra.
84 See notes 29-35 supra and accompanying text.
85 See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
86 See notes 36-46 supra and accompanying text.
87 See notes 39-46 supra and accompanying text.
88 See notes 36-38 supra and accompanying text.
89 In most cases, a plaintiff would choose to bring an equal work suit under the Equal
Pay Act, due to the more generous statute of limitations and the absence of administrative
remedies to exhaust before bringing the claim to court. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452
U.S. 161, 175 n.14 (1981).
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fense in the Equal Pay Act cases are not controverted, courts should
focus on the equality of work when determining the availability of
an economic justification for a sex-based wage disparity.
Todd A. Gale

